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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1692
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8388
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7355
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 4634
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4413
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 4423
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 1943
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0653
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 1343
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0285
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 3107
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 6899
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6729
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 0854
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 5447
RUEHKS0/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 3647
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 7285
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000638

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/J
STATE PASS DOE FOR W. KILMARTIN AND D. CHONG
DHS FOR C. BRZOZOWSKI
CBP CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE FOR D. STAJCAR

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: [ETTC](#) [EWWT](#) [ENRG](#) [ELTN](#) [ETRD](#) [JA](#)
SUBJECT: MEGAPORTS: DOE DELEGATION REVIEWS NEXT STEPS FOR JAPAN'S
PILOT PROJECT

REF: A. STATE 16717
[1](#)B. TOKYO 231
[1](#)C. TOKYO 468

[1](#)1. (SBU) Summary: During a Megaports Initiative technical team's visit to Japan March 10-11, the USG delegation urged the GOJ to engage in more frequent, technical-level exchanges on implementation of its pilot project at the Port of Yokohama. The USG underscored that success of the GOJ pilot project is crucial to USG efforts to promote the Megaports Initiative globally. The delegation also reiterated its concern that the GOJ has established radiation alarm settings that are too high to be effective in detecting radioactive and nuclear materials, not to mention much higher than any other Megaports-related detectors worldwide. The USG offered to provide training and technical assistance, and urged the GOJ to develop both a standard operating procedure for alarm assessment and response, and a training plan. Both sides agreed to continue discussions to develop a mutually agreeable understanding for joint technical cooperation on the pilot project at Yokohama. Concerning Japan's desire to pursue a "reciprocal" scanning arrangement at the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach, GOJ officials concurred with the USG that such discussions continue to be handled separately. End Summary.

Action Items

[1](#)2. (SBU) A team of DOE technical experts, led by Megaports Program Director William Kilmartin, held meetings March 10-11 in Yokohama and Tokyo to discuss next steps for implementation of Japan's first Megaports pilot project, which commenced operations March 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) North American Affairs Bureau Second North Americas Division Director Noriyuki Shikata led the GOJ delegation. Both sides agreed to the following action items:

Japan

--Raw Data: The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation, and Tourism (MLIT), which is responsible for the radiation portal monitors (RPMs), will provide DOE with raw data from the RPMs on a "voluntary basis." (Note: DOE will use the raw data to develop a baseline for appropriate scanning levels and monitor performance of equipment. End note.).

--Information Sharing: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) will review the text of the Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA) to determine if data on identified materials of concern identified in containers destined for a third country can be shared with the USG.

--Equipment Sensors: The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation, and Tourism (MLIT), which is responsible for the radiation portal monitors (RPMs), will provide DOE with dimensions of all the radiation detection sensors in the RPMs.

--Training: The GOJ will develop and share its training plan with the USG. The GOJ will consider the USG's invitation to visit the Los Alamos Laboratory for further exchange on equipment testing methods.

U.S.

--Information Sharing: Following up on the GOJ's earlier proposal, the USG will provide comments and changes to the memo provided by the GOJ regarding information exchanges. The guidelines will define

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parameters and procedures to conduct sharing of data obtained at the Port of Yokohama.

Background: The Ministry of Finance (MOF) claims there is no mechanism to facilitate direct exchange of information between Japan Customs and DOE as currently is the case for exchanges between Japan Customs and DHS/U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) under the bilateral Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA). The GOJ proposes that scanning information be passed from Japan Customs to CBP Container Security Initiative (CSI) officers in Yokohama, who in turn convey it to DOE. DOE agreed to exchange data under the CMAA mechanism. The DOE delegation clarified it only requests information on a limited number of data items in the case of an "alarm event," where materials of concern are identified.

--Training: The DOE will provide a training plan template and methods for evaluating alarm assessment.

--Megaports Worldwide: The USG will provide the GOJ with further explanation about why it designates Megaports in Qatar (like Japan) as a "special project," i.e., outside the scope of standard Megaports' operations.

--Joint Cooperation on the Pilot Project: The DOE will provide GOJ suggestions on frequency and types of technical cooperation in support of the Megaports Initiative pilot project and feasibility study at the Port of Yokohama Minami Honmoku Pier.

--Reciprocity: The USG will respond to the GOJ's separate proposal to share information on Japan-bound containers from the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach.

Background: The USG delegation reiterated that matters pertaining to U.S. outbound containers are unrelated to the Megaports Initiative and should be treated separately. Under the GOJ's proposal to scan selected Japan-bound containers, Japanese CSI officers at the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach would target specific containers of concern for additional radiation screening. To accomplish this screening, the GOJ proposes three options, none of which require additional equipment procurement, according to MOF officials.

A) Use of radiation portal monitors (RPM) to scan targeted cargo as it passes through the import side of the port. (Note: The GOJ

recommendation is based on the understanding RPMs are or will be deployed to scan inbound cargo at the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach. End note.)

B) Use of a portable radioactive isotope identification device (RIID) to screen targeted containers, which would also avoid changing the flow of cargo.

C) Screen cargo through a mobile X-ray machine before it is loaded onto the vessel.

End Action Items.

Pilot Project

¶3. (SBU) In the pilot project's first week (March 2-7), the GOJ reportedly scanned 9,800 containers resulting in two neutron alarms, which were resolved during secondary inspection. (Note: Other Megaports implementation ports -- with more sensitive settings than Japan's -- typically experience a two-percent alarm rate, with 20 percent or less of those alarms referred for secondary inspection.

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End note.) The GOJ estimates the Minami-Honmoku terminal in Yokohama handled approximately 2,500 U.S.-bound containers per day before the economic downturn, a figure that has decreased to approximately 1,700 per day in recent months. At this time, the GOJ has no plans to scan transshipments but will consider doing so in the future. The GOJ acknowledged its radiation detection alarms are set "extremely high" (e.g., five times background) but asserted it plans to adjust the alarm settings based on analysis of data compiled during the pilot project's implementation phase. The DOE delegation said technical experts on both the U.S. and Japanese sides should work together to determine an acceptable alarm threshold.

¶4. (U) The DOE delegation cleared this message after departure from post.
ZUMWALT